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The 1999 Montreal Convention seeks to unify certain rules concerning the liability of air carriers in 
international air transport. This article highlights the problems that the exclusion of national rules in 
favour of a unified international legal regime poses from a consumer protection point of view. 
International trade regulation carries an inherent structural risk of bias in favour of industry rather 
than consumer interests. Drawing inspiration from international human rights law, the alternative of 
an inspired approach based on subsidiarity is put forward, which, instead of seeking rigid uniformity 
at international level, allows for the recognition of a complementary role for international, regional 
and national levels in protecting consumers. The feasibility of adopting such a perspective in 
interpreting the Montreal Convention is also considered. 
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 “[D]emonstrably incorrect”,1 “fundamentally flawed”,2 not just wrong but “WRONG”,3 motivated by 
a “political obsession for consumer rights”,4 “Brussels’s triumphant assertion of power and authority 
sacrific[ing] global uniformity in the rule of law”,5 a Court bent on rewriting legislation and raising 
“serious concerns about the rule of law”:6 it would be a major understatement to say that the 
academic and practising lawyers specialising in aviation law have not received the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice in the IATA7 and in the Sturgeon8 and Nelson9 cases with great enthusiasm. 
Robust criticism of judicial pronouncements is par for the course in academic writing. Such degree of 
vitriol is, however, less common. There seems to be something visceral at stake here going beyond 
genteel senior common room discussions of the respective merits of various interpretations of the 
law. 
If those judgments touched such a raw nerve, it might be because they are perceived to be 
challenging one of the sacred cows of international air transport law, namely the exclusivity of the 
1999 Montreal Convention.10 The Montreal Convention, like its predecessor, the Warsaw 
Convention,11 seeks to harmonise the rules relating to the liability of air carriers for damage or delay 
in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage and cargo. To that end, it contains a clause12 which pre-
empts the application of national or other local rules13 that might otherwise have been applicable in 
the absence of the Convention. This pre-emptive effect is regarded by aviation lawyers as a 
fundamental aspect of the legal regime established by the Montreal Convention14 and reflected in 
the title of the Convention as a Convention for the unification of certain rules for international 
carriage by air. Challenging that pre-emptive effect therefore goes to the root of what the Montreal 
Convention is about and is, in their eyes, anathema.  
 
1 John Balfour, “Further comment on Case C-344/04, The Queen ex parte International Air Transport 
Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v. Department for Transport, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 10 January 2006”, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007), p. 560. 
2 John Balfour, ‘Luxembourg v Montreal: Time for the Hague to Intervene’, in M. Bobek and J. Prassl (eds.), Air 
Passenger Rights: Ten Years On (2016), p. 73. 
3 George N. Tompkins Jr, “Are the Objectives of the 1999 Montreal Convention in Danger of Failure?”, 39 Air 
and Space Law (2014) p. 212. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Paul Stephen Dempsey and Svante O Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws on the Issue of 
Delay in International Air Carriage”, 35 Air and Space Law (2010) p. 224. 
6 John Balfour, “Airline liability for Delays: The Court of Justice of the EU Rewrites EC Regulation 261/2004”, 35 
Air and Space Law (2010) p. 75. 
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9 Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10, Nelson and Others, EU:C:2012:657. 
10 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (adopted 28 May 1999, 
entered into force 4 November 2003) 2242 UNTS 309 (Montreal Convention). 
11 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (adopted 12 October 
1929, entered into force 13 February 1933) 137 LNTS 11 (Warsaw Convention). 
12 Article 29. The corresponding provision in the Warsaw Convention was Article 24. 
13 Such as, for instance, legal provisions adopted by regional organisations like the European Union. 
14 See, for instance, Tompkins, supra note 3, p. 204; Dempsey and Johansson, supra note 5, p. 209. 
It is not the primary purpose of this article to discuss whether the Court of Justice was right or wrong 
in the cases mentioned above.15 It may well be that certain aspects of the judgments could be 
questionable from a purely doctrinal point of view, although one should mention that the reaction 
outside the aviation legal community, and in particular among EU lawyers, 16 was generally more 
subdued and nuanced or even favourable.17My main concern in this contribution is of a more 
normative nature and relates to the deleterious consequences on consumer protection of the 
exclusivity of the Montreal Convention. 
On that terrain, the case in favour of the Montreal Convention is rather more problematic to make. 
Historically, Montreal’s predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, was undoubtedly designed to protect 
airlines from passenger lawsuits. Rather than a consumer protection instrument, it was rather the 
reverse. Even now, however, the exclusivity rule of the Montreal Convention still functions as a 
device to protect airlines from liability to consumers. One might be tempted to argue that this is 
merely contingent and reflects the current preferences of states that are parties to the Convention 
as to how to balance consumer interests and industry interests in the field of international air 
transport. This is tautologically true, in the sense that international treaties are ratified by states and 
the act of ratification, in so far as it entails consent of the state to be bound, ipso facto reflects the 
current preferences of the state concerned at the time of ratification. This, however, is a rather 
formal view of international treaty-making. Looking beyond the formal level, if, as will be argued 
below, international regulation of the airline industry is structurally biased in favour of airline 
interests and if we are serious about protection of international passengers, we cannot be satisfied 
with a system of regulation which purports to exclude other levels of regulation. What we could 
instead do is to approach the protection of consumer rights at international level in the same way as 
we approach the protection of human rights at international level, namely recognising that there is a 
role for international protection but that different levels of regulations (international, regional, 
national) have complementary roles to play in providing a coherent system of protection of 
consumer interests.  
This article will be structured as follows: the role of the exclusivity rule in the Warsaw and Montreal 
Convention in protecting airlines will first be examined (section B). The extent to which industry 
regulation at international level tends to inherently favour industry interests will then be discussed 
(section C). Finally the case for adopting a human rights-inspired, subsidiarity-based approach to 
passenger rights protection will be made (section D).  
 
15 Some aspects of the ECJ caselaw on air passenger rights will however be touched upon below. 
16 See, in particular, Kieran St Clair Bradley, “Case C-344/04, The Queen ex parte International Air Transport 
Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v. Department for Transport, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 10 January 2006”, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) pp. 1101-1124; Koen Lenaerts 
and José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, “The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law”, 47 
Common Market Law Review (2010) pp. 1636-1637; Jules Stuyck, “Indemnisation pour les passagers de vols 
retardés en Europe”, 7 La Semaine Juridique, Edition Générale (2010) pp. 359-363; Jeremias Prassl, “The 
European Union and the Montreal Convention: A New Analytical Framework”, 12 Issues in Aviation Law and 
Policy (2013) pp. 381-412.  
17 To some extent, the contrasting reactions of EU and aviation lawyers may be a reflection of different 
disciplinary “mind-sets.” See David McClean, “EU Law and the Montreal Convention of 1999”, in Bobek and 
Prassl (eds.), supra note 2, p. 57. McClean contrasts what he calls an “internationalist” perspective to a 
“European” one but adds that the CJEU may represent a third distinct “mind-set”. He does not make clear, 
however, how the “European” and “CJEU” mind-sets might in his view differ. 
2 Protecting airlines rather than consumers 
Historically, it is clear that the liability regime established by the Warsaw Convention was 
deliberately set up to protect the airline industry. The Convention’s travaux préparatoires indicate 
that there was concern that “investors and insurance companies feared the uncertainty in the law 
governing international flights” as the “potential liability for a single accident was 
staggering.”18Protecting airlines liability rules that might exist in national law was thus seen as 
crucial, hence the need for an exclusivity clause to block the operation of ordinary domestic rules on 
civil liability.19 In return, a token gesture was made in the direction of passengers in the form of a 
reversal of the burden of proof20 and the exclusion of any further contractual lowering or exclusion 
of liability below the level specified in the Convention.21 Even in 1929, this could hardly be seen as a 
genuine quid pro quo given the huge disproportion between the advantages to air carriers and those 
to passengers but this became even more so over time. Inflation accentuated the negligible 
significance of the issue of further contractual limitations on liability on the already very low ceiling 
imposed by the Convention. As regards the burden of proof, many countries applied or would later 
apply to air accidents legal devices or doctrines, the effect of which was to more or less reverse the 
burden of proof, such as, for instance, the semi-strict liability system of responsabilité du fait des 
choses in French law or the concept of res ipsa loquitur in some common law jurisdictions (not least 
the USA).22 The supposed added value from a consumer perspective of the Warsaw Convention was 
thus minimal whereas the downside was considerable. 
The Montreal Convention, however, purports to engage with consumer protection more seriously 
than its predecessor. Its preamble explicitly refers to the “importance of ensuring protection of the 
interests of consumers in international carriage by air.” With the adoption of a strict liability regime 
up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights in case of death or injury to passengers, the most outrageously 
anachronistic restrictions in the Warsaw regime on airline liability in case of accident have been 
removed. Yet, the persistence of the aim of a unified regime of carrier liability at international level 
and the continued existence of an exclusivity clause in Article 29 of the Montreal allows us to doubt 
the depth of commitment of the Montreal Convention to consumer protection.23 It is clear that this 
clause still acts as a bar to potential liability claims by passengers based on national law, as will be 
seen below.  
What is particularly remarkable is that this exclusivity operates not just against the application of 
general rules on contractual or tortious liability, which was arguably what the exclusivity rule 
 
18 Minutes of the Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12 1929 Warsaw, 
translated by Robert C. Horner and Didier Legrez (1975) pp. 18-23. 
19 Article 24 provides that, in cases falling within the scope of (Articles 17 to 19 of) the Convention, “any action 
for  damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this 
Convention.” 
20 Articles 17 and 20. 
21 Article 23. 
22 With respect to the US, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld and Allan I. Mendelsohn, “The United States and the 
Warsaw Convention”, 80 Harvard Law Review (1967) pp. 519-522. 
23 Article 29 of the Montreal Convention provides that “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any 
action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, 
can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention.” On 
the limited significance of the change of wording compared to Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, see Marc 
McDonald, “The Montreal Convention and the Preemption of Air Passenger Harm Claims”, XLIV The Irish Jurist 
(2010) pp. 218-219.  
primarily targeted, but also any kind of liability or carriers towards passengers of whatever source 
and for whatever purpose, even if founded on statutory duties or even fundamental rights 
protection principles or legislation. In addition to this, the exclusivity rule has the potential to 
prevent the emergence of new legislation to protect air passenger rights in case of travel disruption. 
2.1 Protecting airlines from tortious or contractual liability towards passengers 
The exclusionary effect of the exclusivity rule under the Warsaw and Montreal Convention and the 
creation of zones of legal immunity in which airlines are protected from liability to passengers is well 
illustrated by the two leading cases on that rule in the US and the UK.  
In Tseng,24 decided by the US Supreme Court under the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff claimed 
that she had suffered mental injury as a result of an invasive body search carried out by airline 
security personnel before boarding a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. In Sidhu,25 decided by the UK 
House of Lords also under the Warsaw Convention, 26 a British Airways flight from London to Kuala 
Lumpur made a refueling stop in Kuwait five hours after Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait at the beginning 
of the Gulf war. The aircraft was seized and passengers detained by Iraqi forces for about one 
month, during which they suffered psychological harm as well as, in one case, physical injuries. The 
passengers argued that the airline knew or ought to have known that there was a severe risk of 
passengers being put in danger if the aircraft landed in Kuwait and therefore attributed their injuries 
to the negligence of the airline. Under the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Conventions, the 
carrier is liable for damage in case of death and bodily injuries to the passenger resulting from an 
“accident” which “took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking.”27 In both cases, the parties agreed that there was no “accident” within 
the meaning of the Warsaw Convention and that, therefore, a claim under the Convention would 
fail.28 The question before both courts was therefore whether the exclusivity rule in the Convention 
precluded reliance on another cause of action founded in national law, to which both courts 
answered affirmatively.  
Following the interpretation adopted by the US Supreme Court in Tseng and by the UK House of 
Lords in Sidhu, the effect of the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention is to create bubbles of legal 
immunity, in which the law is incapable of reaching actions by airlines that cause harm to 
passengers: No liability can arise under the Montreal Convention because the harm caused to 
passengers does not result from an “accident” or because the harm does not consist of death or 
bodily injury. Neither can local law apply because, in the carriage of passenger by air, the exclusivity 
clause in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention pre-empts any action based on local law, however 
founded. 
Admittedly, it is debatable whether either case fell at all within the scope of the Convention.29 In 
Tseng, the search was carried out before check-in, which is neither “on board the aircraft” nor, 
 
24 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999). 
25 Sidhu and others v British Airways [1997] A.C. 430. 
26 The slight difference of wording under the Montreal Convention (see supra note 23) would not result in a 
different outcome.  
27 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and 17(1) of the Montreal Convention. 
28 In any event, the claim would in all likelihood also have failed on the ground that the Convention did not 
cover mental injuries which were not associated to a bodily injury. 
29 See McDonald, supra note 23, pp. 216-217. 
arguably, “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” In Sidhu, the 
detention took place while the individuals were in the terminal in Kuwait, which is also neither on 
board the aircraft nor during embarkation or disembarkation operations. However, the Court had 
been asked by the parties in both cases to proceed on the basis that it was accepted that the case 
fell within the scope of the Convention. In any event, this is not crucial for our present purposes: one 
can easily imagine slight tweaks to the facts, such as the search in Tseng being carried out at the gate 
during the embarkation process or the troops in Sidhu detaining passengers on board the aircraft, 
thereby bringing the situation much more clearly within the scope of the Convention. The point here 
is the arbitrariness of leaving those situations outwith the realm where the carrier ought to be 
responsible for harm resulting from its actions. 
Tseng and Sidhu both concerned the potential tortious liability of the air carrier. However, the same 
issue could arise in a contractual context. Thus, an airline could completely fail to deliver the 
onboard service that it has contractually agreed to provide the passenger during flight and yet not 
be liable at all to the passenger on account of this failure: to the extent that the failure to deliver the 
service does not constitute an “accident” and that, moreover, the passenger does not suffer a bodily 
injury as a consequence of that failure, no liability can arise under the Montreal Convention. And 
since the Montreal Convention pre-empts contractual actions as well as tortious ones, no action 
under national law is possible either.30 
2.2 Protecting airlines from statutory duties towards passengers 
As noted above, it is not just ordinary contract and tort claims that are potentially pre-empted by 
the exclusivity rule in the Montreal Convention. Any form of liability of air carriers towards 
passengers, even if it derives from statutory duties reflecting public law and constitutional concerns 
such as issues of protection of fundamental rights, is potentially pre-empted by the Montreal 
Convention. 
The potential impact of the exclusivity rule on fundamental rights can be illustrated by reference to 
two decided cases, in Canada and the UK respectively. 
Thibodeau31 concerned the interaction between the Montreal Convention and the linguistic regime 
in Canada resulting from the Official Languages Act (OLA).32 The OLA establishes a right for members 
of the public to communicate with, and obtain available services from, federal authorities in either 
of two official languages of Canada, viz. English or French. The OLA has been described by the 
Supreme Court of Canada as belonging to “that privileged category of quasi-constitutional legislation 
which reflects ‘certain basic goals of our society’ and must be so interpreted ‘as to advance the 
broad policy considerations underlying it’”.33 It is therefore clear that the rights conferred in the OLA 
have quasi-constitutional status in Canada. The Thibodeaus had flown on a number of occasions on 
Air Canada between Canada and the US and complained that no French-speaking flight attendant 
was available and/or that flight announcements had been made exclusively in English. It was 
 
30 See Knowlton v American Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 6882. On this case, see George N. Tompkins, “The Case 
of the Missing 3 Dollar Breakfast and the Pre-emptive Effect of the Montreal Convention”, 32 Air and Space 
Law (2007) pp. 229-231. 
31 Thibodeau v Air Canada 2014 SCC 67. 
32 R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.) (Can.). 
33 Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, para. 23. 
accepted that this constituted a breach of the Thibodeaus’ language rights under the OLA.34 The 
question that the Supreme Court of Canada had to answer was whether the Thibodeaus’ claim for 
damages under the OLA was pre-empted by the exclusivity rule in the Montreal Convention. Among 
other arguments, the Thibodeaus considered that the Montreal Convention did not contemplate 
claims based on public law and of a quasi-constitutional nature so that the exclusivity rule in the 
Convention should not apply to their claim. While that argument found some support in the Court, 
the majority nonetheless dismissed it and considered that the Montreal Convention precluded any 
claim to damages other than provided for in the Convention by a passenger against a carrier in 
relation to events on board on aircraft or during embarkation or disembarkation. 
The Stott case,35 decided by the UK Supreme Court, concerned a serious failure by an airline to make 
sufficient arrangement to provide for the needs of a disabled passenger, in breach of EU legislation 
on the rights of disabled passengers and its UK implementing measures.36 This resulted in chaotic 
scenes as Mr Stott, who was paralysed from the shoulders down, fell on the floor as his wheelchair 
overturned on entering the aircraft with the crew unable to deal with the situation. His wife also had 
repeatedly to kneel or crouch in the aisle to attend to her husband’s personal needs. The treatment 
of Mr Stott was so disgraceful as to lead Lady Hale in the judgment to conjecture that there was a 
good case to make that the treatment would have amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR has it been meted out by the State rather than a private 
party. In a similar argument to that of the Thibodeaus regarding the scope of the exclusivity rule, Mr 
Stott sought to argue that the Montreal Convention did not seek to regulate the rights of access to 
air travel for disabled people and that, therefore, a claim under EU or UK legislation on the rights of 
disabled passengers would not be pre-empted by the Convention. Like the Canadian Supreme Court, 
however, its UK counterpart considered that the Convention would pre-empt any claim by a 
passenger towards an airline regarding damage caused on board, regardless of the basis for the 
claim. 
In the US, one could also mention the King case,37 concerning a denial of boarding allegedly based on 
racial discrimination, as another example of conflict between fundamental rights and the Warsaw 
Convention pre-empted in favour of the Convention. 
Thus the protective envelope shielding airlines from legal duties towards their passengers is not 
limited to ordinary contract and tort matters but can result in passengers being stripped of the 
fundamental rights they would normally be able to invoke in any other context than that of 
international air transport. 
 
34 While Air Canada is a private company, it used to be a Crown corporation and, as such, a federal institution 
for the purposes of the OLA. At the time of privatization, it was decided that the OLA should remain applicable 
to it notwithstanding the privatization. 
35 Stott v Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd [2014] UKSC 15. 
36 The relevant provisions are Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air [2006] OJ 
L204/1 and the UK Civil Aviation (Access to Air Travel for Disabled Persons and Persons with Reduced Mobility) 
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/1895). 
37 King v American Airlines 284 F 3d 352. 
2.3 Protecting airlines from new legislation on air passenger rights  
The compatibility of the EU regime for protection of air passenger rights in case of flight delays and 
cancellations enshrined in Regulation 261/200438 was one of the issues at stake in the European 
Court of Justice rulings mentioned in the introduction to this article.39  
As interpreted by the Court of Justice,40 Regulation 261/2004 requires carriers, in case of flight 
cancellations or delays exceeding a duration specified in the Regulation, to provide assistance to 
passengers consisting of, inter alia, meals and refreshments as well as overnight accommodation to 
the extent required by the delay41 as well as a fixed amount of compensation as determined by 
Article 7 of the Regulation.42 To the extent that Article 19 of the Montreal Convention provides for 
the liability of the carrier in case of delay, the exclusivity rule in Article 29 of the Convention would 
seem to preempt any competing system of liability of the carrier in case of delay at national or 
supranational level.  
In the IATA case,43 the Court of Justice brushed aside the argument that the liability of airlines to 
passengers in cases of delay was expressly covered by Article 19 of the Convention and therefore fell 
within the scope of the exclusivity clause in Article 29 by distinguishing between two kinds of 
damages in case of delay: damage which is identical or almost identical for all passengers, redress 
for which may be standardized and individual damage which is peculiar to each individual traveler 
and needs to be assessed individually on a case-by-case basis. According to the Court, the Montreal 
Convention is only concerned with the latter and not the former. Therefore, Articles 19 and 29 of the 
Montreal Convention do not preclude rules such as those in Regulation 261/2004 which concern 
redress for the former and not the latter. 
Most aviation lawyers have been very critical of this distinction between two kinds of damages, 
regarding it as wholly artificial and without justification.44 They have a point. The Montreal 
Convention does not distinguish between different kinds of damages. If an action concerns damages 
occasioned by a delay to the carriage by air of passengers, it seems to fall squarely within the scope 
of Article 19 of the Convention, whether those damages are the same for everybody or particular to 
an individual. The two types of damages distinction thus seems like a fig-leaf used by the Court to 
avoid the exclusivity of the Convention.  
Yet, while the phrasing in terms of different kinds of damages was perhaps not particularly helpful, it 
does not follow from this that it is obvious that the Convention necessarily excludes the creation of a 
statutory scheme of assistance to passengers. Another way to look at it is that Regulation 261/2004 
 
38 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and 
of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, [2004] OJ L46/1. 
39 See supra notes 7, 8 and 9. 
40 In case of delay, as distinct from compensation, the wording of the Regulation suggested that the carrier had 
to provide assistance in the form of the “right to care” under Article 9 but not the “right to compensation” 
under Article 7. The Court of Justice, however, read into the Regulation a right to compensation in case of 
delays in the Sturgeon case, supra note 8.  
41 This is the “right to care” provided for in Article 9 of the Regulation. 
42 The amount varies from €125 to €600 depending on the length of the flight and of the delay on arrival at 
destination compared to the original schedule.  
43 n7. 
44 See, for instance, Balfour, supra note 1, pp. 558-560. 
is not concerned at all with damages. The idea of damages is linked to the idea of making good for a 
loss or injury suffered by a person as the consequence of an act or event. This is arguably not what 
Regulation 261/2004 is concerned with. The Regulation is not about redress for loss. It is about 
providing assistance: a delay has occurred. We do not ask ourselves whether an individual has 
suffered a loss as a result of that delay and how we could make good for that loss. We are faced with 
a practical situation: an individual needs assistance (food, accommodation, etc…) and the airline is 
tasked with a duty to provide that assistance. Seen that way, there is no necessary conflict between 
a Convention that exclude competing national rules on damages to passengers in cases of delay and 
national or EU rules concerned with establishing a scheme of assistance to passengers, 
independently of any damages that those passengers may have suffered or not. Nor should we see 
any action in damages for breach of an airline’s obligation under the Regulation as covered by Article 
29 either: such damages are damages for a breach of statutory obligations on the airline which are 
separate and distinct from any action in damages for the delay itself and, therefore, outwith the 
scope of Article 29. 
One might therefore take the view that it is possible to design a scheme of assistance to passengers 
which is compatible with the Montreal Convention and that Regulation 261/2004 establishes such a 
scheme. For present purposes, however, what matters is that it is clear that there is at least a 
tension between an expansive interpretation of the exclusivity rule in the Montreal Convention and 
the development of consumer rights in air passenger transport and that, therefore, Article 29 of the 
Convention has the potential to act as a protector of airlines rather than passengers in this context. 
3 Structural imbalance in the protection of consumer and industry interests in international 
airline regulation  
In Stott, Lady Hale expressed the view that the absence of legal redress to passengers who had been 
so appallingly treated by an airline was disgraceful but she felt that the only way forward was for the 
Convention to be amended. The exposure of such a “grave injustice” in this case, she concluded, 
should lead the international community to turn its attention to the issue.45  
The precedent of the Warsaw Convention, however, does not bode well in terms of the ability of the 
international community to mobilize so as to eradicate “grave injustices” in air carrier liability. The 
shocking character of the pitiful limits on liability in the original Warsaw Convention had already 
been denounced as “anachronistic and unfair” 46 in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, it took almost another 
half a century for agreement to be reached for these provisions to be replaced by less inappropriate 
ones in the Montreal Convention.  
Placing one’s faith in enlightenment on consumer issues at the international level may be somewhat 
imprudent when, both in terms of process and in terms of substance, international air transport 
regulation suffers from structural biases in favour of the industry and to the detriment of 
consumers. In terms of process, the problem is one of imbalance in terms of voice: international 
regulatory processes provide multiple avenues for airlines to influence the process and let their 
voice be heard without a comparable level of representation for consumers. In terms of substance, 
 
45 Stott, paras. 67-70.. 
46 “Protecting Airline Passengers”, New York Times (23 October 1965), p. 30. On the already outdated nature of 
the Warsaw Convention even then, see also Lee S. Kreindler, “The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention”, 
31 Journal of Air Law and Commerce (1965) pp. 291-302. 
international protection of consumer rights tends to gravitate towards the lowest common 
denominator. 
3.1 The influence of airlines in international air transport regulatory processes 
Imbalance in representation of business versus consumer interests is a well-known issue for scholars 
working in consumer law or regulation studies. Part of the problem stems from the disproportionate 
cost of organising diffuse and fragmented interests such as consumer interests compared to the 
more concentrated interest of business, as shown in Olson’s seminal work on collective action over 
50 years ago.47 If a large number of persons stand to each make a relatively small gain from a change 
of policy and a small number of persons on the other side stand to each make a large loss from such 
a change, the latter group will not only find it much easier to collectively organise themselves due to 
their smaller number but each person in the group will have a much stronger incentive to do so than 
members of the former group.48 This is true even if the total gains for the former, more diffuse 
group are very considerably larger than the total losses from the latter group so that the polity as a 
whole would benefit from the policy change. Thus a small group of manufacturers is more likely to 
organise themselves to lobby a policy-maker49 over a given issue than a large group of consumers 
are likely to do. Secondly, and to some extent as a consequence of this, concentrated interests are 
likely to have permanent resources allocated to such lobbying activity, making the marginal cost of 
further lobbying substantially lower. Thirdly, business is also more likely to have resources at its 
disposal, such as information and expertise, which may be useful or even necessary to policy-makers 
and regulators. Even if this need not necessarily lead to full-blown regulatory capture,50 it is likely at 
the very least to afford business access to and the ear of policy-makers, and therefore opportunity 
to influence policy. Fourthly, in so far as economic activity and investments decisions are in the 
hands of business and government policy is dependent on those decisions to attain its objectives, 
this gives business a structurally privileged position in the political decision-making process.51 
The literature, however, is far from unanimous in finding business dominance in regulatory 
processes and outcomes. In the US, Bailey has, for instance, found that there was a tendency to 
under-estimate the ‘quiet influence’ of diffuse interests, such as those of consumer or workers, over 
American trade policy.52 Trumbull has similarly provided multiple examples on both sides of the 
Atlantic of victories of consumer interests over business interests.53 If the claim is that business does 
not always win all battles and that the public interest will sometimes trump private commercial 
interests, then it is undoubtedly true. But this would be setting the bar rather low. If anything, one 
would expect that, in democratic processes, the public interest and collective interest should take 
priority over private commercial interests as a matter of course. There are also methodological 
difficulties in quantifying business influence. Regulatory choices are not necessarily black and white. 
 
47 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965). 
48 One should also add that large groups are also more prone to give rise to free-rider problems. 
49 Or indeed lobby individually for very large businesses. 
50 One need not, therefore, necessarily conclude that 'as a rule, regulation is acquired by industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.' (George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Regulation”, 2 The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science (1971) p. 3). 
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Those entrusted with regulatory design may have multiple choices along a spectrum of possible 
solutions which may be more or less favourable to business. The fact that the one which is most 
favourable to the industry has not been adopted does not per se indicate a lack of influence of 
business if the least favourable one has also not been adopted.  
Looking at it with lawyer’s eyes, and therefore with a greater focus on legitimacy considerations 
rather than the raw political fact of influence in itself, it is also somewhat problematic to equate 
influence exercised through open debate in the public sphere and influence exercised in private 
discussions. From this perspective, it is worth pointing out that diffuse interests tend to rely on 
different mechanisms and different institutional points of entry to make their voice heard in 
decision-making processes. Diffuse interests tend to be more reliant on outside lobbying so as to put 
electoral pressure on elected representatives through public opinion.54 They therefore tend to be 
more successful in relation to issues which are high profile and which involve input from 
legislatures.55 By contrast, business interests tend to be more reliant on inside lobbying and ‘quiet 
words’56 discreetly whispered to the ears of decision-makers in executive or administrative 
institutions.57 
A consequence of this of relevance to our particular context is that the environment of international 
treaty negotiations, dominated as it is by the executive with a limited scope for legislatures to 
influence outcomes, tends to exacerbate the difficulties encountered by diffuse interests such as 
consumer interests to make their voice heard. Admittedly, international NGOs and social 
movements representing diffuse interests have in the last couple of decades prised open to some 
extent the doors of the international treaty-making citadel58 and opportunity structures for diffuse 
interests to influence policy outcomes can exist in international negotiations. 59 International air 
transport regulation, however, has to date remained much closer to Keohane and Nye’s ‘club 
model’60 that used to characterise international intergovernmental negotiations on trade policy and 
regulation, that is to say a model in which like-minded sectorally specialised officials negotiate in a 
closed manner among themselves, presenting other constituencies, such as domestic legislatures 
and the wider public, with the fait accompli of an international agreement that can only be accepted 
or rejected as a whole. What is more, the historic links between airlines and national governments 
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as well as the structure of the airline industry, notably the existence of a strong organisation 
representing airline interests, have further accentuated the marginalisation of the consumer voice 
compared to that of the industry. 
3.1.1 Airlines and governments 
Historically, airlines have entertained extremely close relationships with governments. For a large 
part of the 20th century, air carriers were mostly state-owned. That states should have a strong 
interest in transport industries is not in itself surprising. The existence of a functioning transport 
infrastructure is usually regarded as essential to the proper functioning of the economy and 
therefore an important element of industrial policy. The interests of states in air transport went, 
however, beyond that and regarded the provision of air transport services as a manifestation of 
sovereignty,61 giving rise to a culture of “aero-nationalism.”62 This resulted in the development of a 
highly regulated environment at the international level under the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation,63 in which each state ensured that the interests of its own flag carrier 
were protected in international air transport.64 National aviation policy was heavily focused on 
supporting the flag carrier.65 
The late 1980s, however, saw a marked shift towards deregulation and privatisation of the airline 
industry.66This has undoubtedly had a significant impact on the relationship between airlines and 
governments, particularly in the EU where governments have lost much of their ability to financially 
support their own airlines. On the other hand, it is clear that relationships between airlines and 
governments have remained close. As Kassim notes in the EU context, national governments “are no 
longer the gate keepers for national interests” and airlines lobby EU institutions directly, they 
nevertheless also look to their government to pursue their interests in Council negotiations.67 Van 
den Polder’s account of the lobbying efforts of KLM around the time of airline liberalisation in the EU 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s gives a good flavour of the extent to which national governments 
can act as the transmission belt of airline interests in international negotiations.68 Even though KLM 
was one of the rare flag carriers in the EU not to be majority-owned by its Member State, it is clear 
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that the positions adopted by the Dutch government in meetings of the EU Council of Ministers 
largely reflected those of KLM.69  
3.1.2 The role of IATA 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) defines its mission as representing, leading and 
serving the airline industry.70 In other words, IATA is a worldwide trade association for the airline 
industry. Its airline members, taken together, represent over 80% of total worldwide air traffic.71 
Historically, however, IATA has been far more than a mere trade association. Under the system of 
regulation of international aviation set up under the Chicago Convention, states would negotiate in 
bilateral agreements which airlines would be allowed to operate which routes between the two 
states concerned, as well as capacity and frequencies on those routes. While fares to be practised on 
the route would be subject to state approval, the determination of these prices was left essentially 
to negotiations between airlines carried out in the context of IATA-organised “tariff conferences”, 
with states rubber-stamping the outcome of these negotiations. In addition to this official role in 
price regulation, IATA also contributed in many ways to the adoption of common rules by its 
member airlines, such as, for instance, contractual terms between airlines and passengers, through 
recommendations issued to its member airlines. IATA was therefore deeply embedded in the 
regulatory system of international aviation. While the gradual liberalisation of air transport at 
international level, first in the US and later in other jurisdictions, notably the EU, has led to the 
disappearance of the system of IATA tariff conferences and therefore of the formal regulatory role of 
IATA in that context, IATA has remained a significant actor and a privileged interlocutor for states 
when considering changes to air transport regulation at international level. IATA participates 
regularly in the work of ICAO, which is the UN specialised agency dealing with civil aviation created 
by the Chicago Convention with the mission to serve as a global forum for states to develop policies 
and standards related to civil aviation.  
The depth of involvement of the airline industry, through IATA, in the regulation of air carriers 
liability towards passenger is patent when one looks at the regulatory history leading up to the 
Montreal Convention 
3.1.3  Historical involvement of airlines in the regulation of air carriers’ liability towards 
passengers 
It was noted above that the Warsaw Convention had been adopted in 1929 to protect the nascent 
commercial aviation industry by severely limiting the liability of airlines towards, in particular, 
passengers. That the Warsaw Convention should have survived over 70 years throughout the period 
of massive growth of air passenger transport is astonishing, given the vigorous condemnations of the 
Convention by many commentators as “heinous, absurd, archaic, outmoded and outrageous” 72 and 
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the strong position adopted by the main state player in the field, the US, arguing for reform and 
coming extremely close to denouncing the Convention.73 
There were numerous attempts at overhauling the Warsaw Convention, which were mostly 
unsuccessful.74 Meaningful change, however, came not so much from formal amendments to the 
Convention but rather from voluntary agreements entered into by the airlines under pressure from 
the US and, to a lesser extent, a number of other states. In that sense, the real-world Warsaw 
liability regime was to a significant extent determined by the extent to which major air carriers were 
willing to accept new rules more protective of consumers. The first of these agreements was the 
Montreal Inter-carrier Agreement in 1966, which IATA encouraged member airlines to sign in return 
from an assurance from the US government that it would withdraw its notice of denunciation of the 
Warsaw Convention. Under this agreement, carriers agreed to apply a much more favourable 
compensation regime for passengers than that legally applicable under the Warsaw Convention.75 
The next significant change to the legal regime applicable to air carrier liability was the so-called 
“Japanese initiative”, under which international Japanese carriers unilaterally agreed to accept 
liability up to SDR 100,000 on the basis of strict liability and without limit on the basis of a rebuttable 
presumption of fault. IATA followed a few years later with an inter-carrier agreement (the 1996 IATA 
agreement), which most international airlines are signatories to, establishing a liability regime 
similar to the Japanese initiative.76 
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What these initiatives show is that the airlines, whether individually or through IATA, were clearly 
key players in the definition of the rules applicable to air carrier liability to passengers. As Abeyratne 
put it, the airline industry ‘took over’ the management of the Warsaw system.77 This is not to say 
that they unilaterally and autonomously decided what those rules should be. Clearly, they acted in 
the context of the shadow of potential governmental action, especially in the US. Nonetheless, they 
were key actors and the main interlocutor of governments in deciding which rules were or were not 
acceptable in relation to air carrier liability to passengers. The system of regulation changed only to 
the extent that the airlines were willing to accept those changes. 
Overall, therefore, it is clear that the voice of airlines can be heard loud and clear in processes of 
regulation at international level. By way of contrast, outside the sphere of domestic politics and 
legislative processes,78 there is little room for passengers to be in a position to express their views in 
an influential manner. This imbalance in representation between airlines and passengers in 
international air transport regulatory processes is compounded by the natural tendency of 
international consumer rights protection to head towards lower echelons of protection.  
3.2 The tendency towards the lowest common denominator in international protection of 
consumer rights 
The case for harmonization of the rules on liability of air carriers towards passengers is rarely 
discussed. It seems to be generally accepted in the field as quasi-axiomatic that uniformity of rules 
on liability of carriers is in principle a good thing. If pushed, supporters of uniformity will usually 
argue that uniformity is desirable to regulate an activity that is inherently international,79 in 
particular to avoid potential problems arising out of conflicts of laws.80 Such generalisations are, 
however, debatable. The international nature of an activity should certainly lead us to reflect 
whether, and if so to what extent, the activity should be regulated at local, regional or international 
level. However, it cannot be taken for granted that the international level is a priori the more 
appropriate level of regulation. There is a danger here of adopting again an industry-centric view 
rather than a consumer-centric one.  
From the perspective of the industry, there is a case to be made that, regardless of their substantive 
content, uniform rules per se facilitate cross-border trade.81 The argument here has two main 
dimensions: first, a company trading across multiple jurisdiction only has to familiarise itself with 
one set of uniform rules rather than a multiplicity of legal systems, each with its own vagaries and 
peculiarities. Thus, an airline providing air services from Frankfurt to Buenos Aires, Tokyo, 
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Johannesburg or Toronto would not have to preoccupy itself with the intricacies of German, 
Argentinian, Japanese, South African or Canadian tort law with respect to its liability towards 
passengers nor with specific consumer legislation in these jurisdictions and could instead rely on the 
uniform international rules with respect to their liability towards all of their passengers, regardless 
of where they originate from or fly to. Secondly, uniform rules avoid the uncertainty, and potential 
opportunistic forum shopping,82 resulting from divergent private international law rules depending 
on the national jurisdiction where litigation is started. For airlines, therefore, the advantages of 
being regulated by uniform international rules, as long as those rules are not in themselves 
excessively onerous, is therefore clear. The same may also be true, albeit perhaps to a lesser degree, 
for many cargo consignors and consignees, especially for those who regularly ship or receive goods 
to or from multiple jurisdictions.  
For passengers, however, the benefits of harmonisation are rather more debatable. There has been 
a growing tendency in private international law, especially, 83 but not exclusively,84 in Europe, to 
recognise that international consumer transactions call for specific solutions compared to other 
commercial transactions and that expecting consumers to seek legal redress in foreign courts under 
foreign law is generally illusory and tantamount to depriving them of any realistic remedy. With 
respect to the question of applicable law, having uniform rules is one solution to this issue but it is 
not the only one. Another one, exemplified in the EU by Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation,85 is to 
ensure that consumers, at any rate ‘passive’ consumers  who do not actively physically or virtually 
cross the border to seek goods and services from a  supplier in another State, are not deprived of the 
protection afforded by mandatory consumer protection rules in their home state. 
A major problem with relying on uniform rules versus local protection of the home state of the 
consumer lies in the difficulty of finding a universally acceptable standard for what constitutes an 
appropriate level of consumer protection. Consumer expectations tend to be closely bound to the 
socio-economic context of the place of residence of the consumer. Our understanding of what a 
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consumer can and should reasonably expect is anchored in our local legal culture. What is regarded 
as entirely appropriate protection of consumers in one society may well be regarded in another as 
unwarranted and costly paternalistic interference with economic freedom in another. We cannot 
assume that air passengers from Japan, Fiji, Denmark, China, Bolivia, Canada or Ethiopia all share a 
common perspective of what consumer protection legislation in air transport should achieve. The 
preamble of the Montreal Convention expresses the conviction of the parties that “collective State 
action for further harmonization […] is the most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance 
of interests.” However, the very notion that an “equitable balance of interests” is something that 
can be defined universally, outside any particular socio-economic context seems highly dubious. We 
may well be capable in the context of treaty negotiations to reach some kind of agreement but it 
does not follow from this that this agreement will be reflective of an “equitable balance of 
interests”. In fact, it is more likely than not that this agreement will not reflect such a balance: an 
agreement seeking unified rules across a wide geographical scope is likely to tend towards the 
lowest common denominator so as to achieve the maximum number of ratifications across a large 
number of states. As Wilhemsson has pointed out, harmonisation of private law is not ideologically 
neutral: the development of rules of consumer protection or other ‘welfarist’ approaches tend to be 
closely-bound to social and cultural developments within states. Harmonisation of private law tends 
therefore to push towards a return to classical liberalism. 86 The trend in European consumer law in 
the last ten years towards total harmonisation has not been without critics.87 The case against total 
harmonisation is a fortiori considerably stronger at the broader international level, characterised by 
much greater diversity in terms of legal culture and consumer expectations as well as by a much less 
integrated, responsive and democratically accountable law-making system. 
If, therefore, the adoption of uniform rules resolves some of the difficulties not only for airlines but 
also for passengers that result from the potential application of multiple legal systems to their legal 
relations, it does so at a potentially significant cost for passengers in jurisdictions with higher than 
average levels of consumer protection, who may lose the higher level of protection afforded by the 
local law. To that extent, uniform rules are a second-best solution over the compulsory application 
of mandatory consumer protection rules in the consumer’s home state.88 Admittedly, application of 
local rules does represent additional complexity and costs to airlines. However, if a trader decides to 
enter the market of a given state by directing their commercial activities towards consumers in that 
state, it is reasonable that such a trader be subject to local regulatory standards, including those 
related to consumer protection. 
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4 International human rights protection as a model for international consumer rights protection  
 
4.1 Are consumer rights human rights? 
There has been a growing tendency in the last couple of decades to approach consumer rights in 
terms of fundamental rights. Writers such as Deutsch89 or Benöhr and Micklitz90 have thus argued in 
favour of recognizing consumer rights as belonging to a third generation of human rights. From a 
procedural point of view, they would point out the increasing degree of recognition of the 
importance of consumer protection in international instruments, such as the United Nations 
Guidelines on Consumer Protection (UNGCP), and the enhanced protection of consumer rights in 
national or regional constitutional documents.91 From a substantive point of view, they would draw 
attention to the increased need for consumer protection at international level resulting from 
globalisation and highlight the similarity between consumer rights and other economic and social 
rights as well as the existence of some rights which are already recognised as fundamental rights,92 
some aspects of which could be seen as a particular manifestation of, or at least related to, 
consumer rights. 
Aside from the age-old scepticism among some towards economic and social rights in general,93 
objections to recognition as human rights of consumer rights specifically tends to follow one of two 
lines of argument. 
The first line of argument links back to what we might call following Alston the ‘quality control’ 
issue:94 consumer rights would not be fundamental enough to deserve the ‘human rights’ label. The 
argument here is that fundamental rights inflation debases the fundamental rights currency and 
makes it less useful. If virtually every right is a successful candidate for the ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ 
epithet, the concept of human rights or fundamental rights loses its distinctiveness. The invocation 
by advocates of consumer rights as human rights of recognition in instruments such as the UNGCP is 
to some extent an attempt at showing that this quality control threshold has been met. Opinions 
might differ as to whether this is the case and the fact that the UNGCP largely eschew the language 
of fundamental human rights does not help in this respect. Harding, Kohl and Salmon, however, 
approach this concern from a slightly different angle.95 They acknowledge the issue of potential risk 
of devaluation of the fundamental rights currency. To use their metaphor, if the ‘fundamental right’ 
label is meant to function as a trump card over ordinary, non-fundamental rights, it becomes useless 
if all the cards in the pack are trump cards. This, however, does not necessarily lead to rejecting new 
categories or types of fundamental rights. Such an approach could, they argue, be insufficiently 
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sensitive to societal change. Another way to address the issue might be through the balancing of 
interests that is inherent in fundamental rights adjudication in all but a handful of exceptions.96 
Recognising consumer rights as fundamental rights does not necessarily imply that every aspect of 
consumer protection should be regarded as capable of trumping any competing claim. 
The second line of argument often invoked against recognition of consumer rights is that 
fundamental rights are rights against the State. Consumer rights are invoked in the market place for 
the most part against private parties, making them, the argument goes, unsuitable for recognition as 
fundamental rights. One could counter-object that, while it is indeed the case that pure ‘horizontal’ 
effect of fundamental rights between private parties is rather uncommon,97 it is nonetheless the 
case that ‘indirect’ or ‘diagonal’ application of fundamental rights norms, flowing from a duty on the 
State to protect individuals from interference with their fundamental rights by a private party, is 
generally accepted in human rights law.98 
While there is therefore a plausible case for seeing consumer rights as fundamental rights, it might 
not even be necessary for consumer rights to share every single attribute of the concept of 
fundamental rights for our present purposes. 
One of the attractions of a fundamental rights discourse in the consumer sphere is that it brings to 
the fore the underlying power structure that brings about inequalities and potential for abuse. 
Consumer law is premised on the existence of such an inequality between consumers and traders to 
the detriment of the former. Approached from a fundamental rights point of view, the function of 
consumer rights is to protect or empower the structurally weaker party in market transactions so as 
prevent exploitation and abuse of power by the other side. 
This asymmetry between the parties and the notion of consumer law as designed to protect one side 
is what matter most for us here. One of the declared aims of the Montreal Convention, as affirmed 
in its preamble, is to achieve “an equitable balance of interests” between the parties. There are two 
ways, however, in which we can approach the question of balance of interests between the parties. 
We can adopt the commutative logic that underlies classical contract law, in which both parties to 
the contract are in principle interchangeable. Within that logic, we can, for instance, regulate 
international contracts for the sale of goods in a manner that achieves an ‘equitable balance of 
interests’ between buyer and seller. In the context of the Montreal Convention, it might perhaps be 
appropriate for the provisions of the Convention relating to the carriage of cargo to achieve an 
‘equitable balance’ between the interests of consignor, consignee and carrier. 
If, however, we regard passengers as consumers and consumer rights as fundamental rights, a 
different approach is required. The objective of achieving an ‘equitable balance of interests’ remains. 
 
96 Protection from torture would spring to mind as one such exception. 
97 The case of horizontal application of constitutional rights in South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Ireland are 
often discussed as exceptions to the general situation. For a discussion of horizontal application of social and 
economic rights in these two jurisdictions, see Aoife Nolan, “Holding non-state actors to account for 
constitutional economic and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland”, 
12 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2014) pp. 61-93. 
98 For a discussion of the issue in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Andrew 
Clapham, Human rights in the private sphere (1993). More generally, see Jan Arno Hessbruegge, “Human 
Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors”, 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review (2005) pp. 
21-88. 
As noted above,99 most fundamental rights adjudication involves a balancing of interests. However, 
achieving that balance has to recognise the asymmetry between the parties. Achieving such a 
balance in this context is essentially an exercise in redressing the imbalance in power between them.  
4.2 Protecting consumer rights at international level: the relevance of human rights 
We saw above that consumer expectations tend to be closely bound to the socio-economic context 
in which the consumer lives, which makes the case for unification of consumer law at international 
level rather difficult to defend. This does not mean, however, that there is no role for consumer law 
at the international level and human rights law provides a useful point of reference in this respect.  
While the very idea of ‘human’ rights contains an implicit aspiration to universality, it must at the 
same time recognise that those rights are exercised in a wide variety of cultural and socio-economic 
environments which may call for a certain degree of adaptation or accommodation to different 
national legal contexts. The notion of subsidiarity can be used as a broad conceptual umbrella to 
encompass the various tools and techniques developed by human rights law at international, 
regional and local level to attempt to resolve that tension between universalism and localised 
differentiation.100  
It is not the place here to go into the details of those tools and techniques, many of which may be of 
limited direct relevance for our present concerns, nor should we regard subsidiarity as a panacea 
with the ability to unequivocally settle debates about the respective roles of international, 
supranational or national law in protecting rights. As Føllesdal observed, what subsidiarity does is to 
help us structure, rather than resolve, debates about allocation of authority in a multilevel system.101  
However, the idea of coordination and complementarity between various levels of regulation, which 
subsidiarity carries with it, provides us with a useful way to look at the role of consumer law at the 
international level. To the extent that we are talking about protecting rights, provisions like Article 
53 of the European Convention on Human Rights102 or Article 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,103 which seek to preserve the protection afforded by other instruments, contribute to the 
development of a multi-layered system of rights protection in which each level acts as floor on which 
more localised levels might build further.  
Thus, whether one fully accepts consumer rights as human rights or not, this notion of a multi-level 
system of rights protection in which the complementary roles of various layers are recognised seems 
attractive. It is difficult to see, however, how such an approach can be reconciled with the logic of 
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Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.” 
103 Article 53 of the Charter provides that “[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or 
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application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of 
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unification of rules and complete isolation from other norms that underlies Article 29 of the 
Montreal Convention. 
4.3 Subsidiarity and the Montreal Convention 
Subsidiarity and exclusive jurisdiction are antithetical. Adopting a subsidiarity-oriented reading of 
the Montreal Convention would therefore require us to minimize the effect of Article 29.  
At a maximalist end of the spectrum, one can read the exclusivity clause in the Montreal Convention 
as excluding any liability or carrier towards passengers other than under the Convention while 
passengers are on board or embarking or disembarking from the aircraft. This was the path chosen 
by the US Supreme Court in Tseng104 and the UK House of Lords in Sidhu105 in the context of Article 
24 of the Warsaw Convention.  
At the minimalist end, one could read the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention as being limited to 
cases involving liability for death or physical injury resulting from an accident on board or during 
embarkation and disembarkation and not covering situations which do not constitute an accident or 
liability claims for other damage than death or physical injury. Limiting the exclusivity to liability 
resulting from accidents would lead to a different outcome not only in cases like Tseng or Sidhu but 
also in cases like King, Thibodeau or Stott106 where the liability is anchored in public law and 
constitutional norms.   
Whether the maximalist interpretation adopted in Tseng and Sidhu was justified is debatable. 
McDonald has convincingly argued that such a wide interpretation could not be seen as 
straightforwardly flowing from either the wording or purpose of the Warsaw Convention and that 
there are strong arguments for adopting a narrower reading of the exclusivity clause.107 Regardless 
of what constituted the proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, the fact that the Montreal 
Convention attempts to shift the cursor to some extent in the direction of the consumer and 
explicitly refers to consumer protection in the preamble could constitute an argument in favour of a 
less extensive reading of its Article 29, notwithstanding the absence of significant material change in 
its wording compared to Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention. The sensitivity of consumer issues to 
the socio-economic context would also militate in favour of an evolutive reading of norms affecting 
consumer rights similar to what is practised in the context of human rights, such as the ‘living 
instrument’ approach to the ECHR of the European Court of Human Rights. 108 The precedent of 
being trapped for seventy years with the Warsaw Convention in a legal regime which had for 
decades been recognized as anachronistic provides us with a clear example of why such an evolutive 
approach is required in consumer matters. The process of amending multilateral treaties is too slow 
and cumbersome to allow for a nimble, flexible and reactive adaptation to constantly changing 
socio-economic environments and market circumstances. 
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107 Supra note n23, pp. 213-215 and 224-229. 
108 For a recent discussion of the appropriateness of this approach, see Stefan Theil, “Is the ‘Living Instrument’ 
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If we turn to state practice since the adoption of the Montreal Convention, it would tend to suggest 
that the parties’ understanding of the scope of their obligations under the Convention is not quite in 
line with a maximalist interpretation of Article 29. It is not just the European Union109 with 
Regulation 261/2004110 but also numerous other states111 which have felt the need to adopt 
additional legislation to assist consumers in case of flight delays and cancellations to provide 
protection going further than the Convention. 
The industry, in particular through IATA, has been strongly opposed to these initiatives, expressing 
concern before the European Court of Justice112 and elsewhere113 that they ran counter to the 
exclusivity of the Montreal Convention. We noted above that the European Court of Justice had 
taken a different view and considered the EU legislation compatible with the Convention and an 
alternative explanation was also put forward to defend the view that air passenger rights legislation 
similar to Regulation 261/2004 should fall outside the scope of Article 29 of the Convention.114 The 
fact that no less than around half of the signatories to the Montreal Convention have adopted such 
legislation would seem consistent with the view that the states themselves have a rather different 
and more minimalist and consumer-friendly reading of Article 29 than IATA. 
5 Conclusion  
 
The aim of elaborating a universally applicable system of liability of air carriers towards passengers 
in the Montreal Convention comes at a substantial price in terms of consumer protection. As 
currently interpreted by the industry, the majority of aviation law scholars as well as cases such as 
Tseng, Sidhu or Stott,115 the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention has the effect of enveloping 
airlines in a protective shield where, as long as no accident, death or injury ensues, passengers who 
step onboard an international flight are largely stripped of many rights that they would take for 
granted on the ground. 
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The unification of (certain) rules is an explicit objective of the Convention. It is therefore unavoidable 
that the Convention will have the effect of insulating airlines from the consequences of liability that 
might otherwise arise under national or supranational law. The question is the extent of the 
immunity it bestows on carriers. If one looks at the Montreal Convention as primarily a trade 
facilitation instrument, the function of which is to protect airlines from the vagaries of national and 
supranational liability rules, be it at the detriment of consumers, it makes perfect sense to give the 
Convention the maximum pre-emptive effect over national and supranational law. This was clearly 
the case of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, whose purpose was unambiguously to severely limit the 
liability of airlines. If, however, one considers that the main object of the Montreal Convention is to 
protect consumers rather than facilitating trade and protecting airlines, a more restrictive 
interpretation of the scope of pre-emption by the Convention is in order. 
One cannot count on regulation of airline liability towards passengers at international level to be 
sufficiently protective of consumers. This is partly due to the international legal environment being 
more open to influence from industry than consumers. The air transport industry provides a 
particularly striking example of this with the deep embedding of industry interests in the 
international regulatory environment, notably through IATA. More fundamentally, however, even if 
a more balanced representation of interests could be achieved, the problem remains that the weight 
that should be given to consumer interests and the form that consumer protection should take 
tends to be closely bound to the particular socio-economic context in which it arises. Uniformity 
might make sense in a relatively homogeneous group of states where expectations are broadly 
comparable. At a universal level, however, conceptions of consumer protection are too 
heterogeneous to allow for a uniform approach. 
This paper has put forward the view that a human rights-inspired approach to the protection of 
consumer interests, and in our particular context air passenger rights, centred on the idea of 
subsidiarity is required if we are to treat air passenger rights seriously. Ultimately, this should lead us 
to completely reject the pre-emptive effect of the Montreal Convention and approach the 
Convention as offering a floor of protection to which national and supranational law can add. This 
would require the Convention to be amended. Even without amendment, however, it should be 
possible, as was argued above, to adopt a more consumer-friendly, evolutive and subsidiarity-
oriented of the Convention so as to at least limit its pre-emptive effect and adapt it to the evolution 
of our expectations in terms of consumer protection.  Is it really defensible in an era that recognises 
consumer rights to adopt an interpretation of the Montreal Convention which would leave a 
consumer who has purchased an expensive airline ticket without legal recourse against an airline 
which denies her any of the on board amenities that are associated with such a ticket?116 Is it really 
defensible to adopt an interpretation of the Montreal Convention which would leave an individual 
who has been deliberately discriminated on the basis of their race or a disabled passenger who has 
been treated in an inhumane or degrading manner without legal recourse against the airline 
responsible for such acts?117 This writer thinks not.  
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